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INTRODUCTION 
  
Although its contribution on GDP creation continues declining, 
agricultural sector remains to be utmost important. Of in particular its roles on 
employment creation, poverty alleviation, and national food security enhancement. 
The last three may be the most critical issues faced by Indonesia now and some 
years to come. In Indonesia in 2002, unemployment rate was still very high; open 
unemployment 9.0 percent or 9,132 million persons and underemployment 31.17 
percent or 31,411 million persons. Poverty incidence is also still very high. In 
2002, the poverty incidence was 18.2 percent or 38.4 million persons. Most of the 
unemployed or underemployed are poor people, live in rural areas and are 
dependent on agriculture for their living. Food security, especially of its self-
reliance, is also a pressing problem for Indonesia. 
 Increasing agricultural production, food stuffs in particular, is clearly 
directly contributing to enhancing national food security. Many studies have 
shown that agricultural growth is the most effective one among all sector in the 
economy for employment creation and poverty alleviation (Islam and Nazara, 
2000; Sumarto and Suryahadi, 2004; Simatupang and Dermoredjo, 2003). Higher 
agricultural growth is beneficial for improving over all economic growth. 
Promoting high and sustainable agricultural production growth may be the most 
appropriate strategy to achieve the three top priority of national development 
objectives: reducing unemployment, eradicating poverty, and achieving self-
reliance based national food security. 
 But statistics have shown that agricultural productions, of almost all 
commodities, have been slowing down in recent years. This raises some questions 
to answer. What are the profiles of production growth of the major agricultural 
commodities, their rate and sources, over time?  What are the constraints, 
opportunities and policies to revitalize and or accelerate the commodity 
production growth?  These all are basically supply side questions of agricultural 
commodities. 
                                                     
1 Paper presented on International Agricultural Conference, held  by United Nation Support for 
Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR), 12 – 13 February 2004, Jakarta. 
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 This paper reviews the supply side issues. The commodity coverage 
encompassing food, horticulture and estate crops which are all land based 
production. Production growth rate is computed and decomposed by its sources: 
harvested area (land size and cropping intensity), and yield. The constraints are 
identified as those related to the sources of the commodity production. The 
constraints may also include product distribution abstracts as well as unavailability 
of incentives that determine willingness to produce. It is in this sense the focus are 
supply constraints rather than just production constraints. 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
  
Supply constraints include production and distribution constraints. They 
may be micro (individual specific) or macro constraints, as well as direct and 
indirect constraints. The constraints are numerous and complex. In this review, the 
discussion is focused on some macro constraints which are considered of high 
important and can be addressed with some appropriate government policies. The 
framework on identifying the constraints is summarized in Figure 1. 
 By computation, production is harvested area times yield. Production 
growth, then, can be decomposed into two sources, harvested area and yield 
growths: 
 Q = A    Y 
 gQ = gA  +  gY     ..............................................................................(1) 
 Q = production 
 A = harvested area 
 Y =  yield 
 g = growth 
For commodity which can be harvested more than once per year, e.q. rice, 
harvested area can be computed as arable land size times cropping intensity. The 
sources of production growth can be further decomposed into arable land size, 
cropping intensity, and yield: 
 gQ = gLS + gCI + gY……………………………….. .....................(2) 
 LS = arable land size 
 CI = cropping intensity 
 Production constraints, therefore, can be related to either harvested area or 
yield (equation 1). The harvested area constraints can be further decomposed into 
arable land size or cropping intensity related factors (equation 2). Due to data 
limitation, harvested area growth decomposition is only feasible for paddy. A 
commodity is said being plaqued with supply constraints if any of its sources of 
production growth has declining growth rate. The next step then is to identify the 
determinants of declining growth of the production growth components (Figure 1). 
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 Distribution constraints will be proxied with price margin of the 
respective commodity. Large and increasing price margin can be interpreted that 
the commodity is plaqued with distribution constraints. This may caused by 
market failures, policy failures, or limitations of some marketing related 
infrastructure. Discussion will be continued on strategy and policy options to deal 
with the identified constraints. 
 
DOES THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR FACE SUPPLY CONSTRAINTS? 
 
Aggregate Production (Gross Domestic Product) 
 Let us first check agricultural production profile at aggregate level based 
on the trend of GDP and aggregate production index as shown in Table 1.  
Agricultural GDP and aggregate production have consistent trend. Both were 
having increasing growth during the 1967 – 1986 and then experienced an 
accelerated declining growth rate. Their peak were in 1978–1986. This was the 
period when the government had sufficient resources (from both oil revenue and 
foreign assistant). The government was wisely spent a large portion of its budget 
to support agricultural development especially for large investments in estate and 
food crop subsectors. The government developed extensive infrastructure and land 
development. This huge investment was also complemented with development of 
massive supporting institutions, such as extension service and rural cooperatives, 
concessional credits and price incentives. 
 
Table 1. Growth Rates of Agricultural GDP and Aggregate Production, 1967-2001 
(%/Year) 
 
 
Periods 
1967-78 1978-86 1986-97 1997-01 
Agricultural GDP 
    - Food crops 
    - Estate crops 
    - Livestock 
    - Fisheries 
3.39 
3.58 
4.53 
2.02 
3.44 
5.72 
4.95 
5.85 
6.99 
5.15 
3.38 
1.90 
6.23 
5.78 
5.36 
1.57 
1.62 
1.29 
-1.92 
5.45 
Agricultural Production 
    - Land productivity 
    - Labor productivity 
3.57 
2.08 
2.32 
6.76 
4.13 
5.57 
3.99 
1.83 
2.03 
-0.47 
-1.45 
-0.47 
Source:  Arifin (2003) 
 
 Trend reversal occurred in 1986 when Indonesia have to launch massive 
structural adjustment policies. As argued by Arifin (2003), the sharp drop and 
continous declining of GDP growth rate since 1986 was largely due to government 
policy deconstruction. The government reduced its investment expenditure on 
agriculture, and in the same time also gradually reduced its incentives and 
facilities for production promotion. 
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Consistent with GDP, the aggregate agricultural production growth rate 
was increasing during the 1967 – 1986 period and reached its peak in 1978 – 
1986. Since 1986, the growth rate declined sharply and even was negative in 1997 
– 2001. The accelerated declining of both GDP and aggregate production growth 
rates can be considered as strong indication that the agricultural sector has been 
facing an increasingly tighter production constraints. We suspect that the 
agricultural sector is now at the edge of persistent low growth or muddle through 
situation. 
 The persistent very low agricultural growth rate is really an alarming 
problem. Of in particular is food crops subsector which grew less than 2 percent 
per year since 1986-97 period. Estate food crop subsector growth rate that 
suddenly dropped from its astonishing record at 6.23 percent per year in 1986-
1997 to only 1.29 percent per year in 1997-2001 period should also be of our great 
concerned. Worst yet, the livestock subsector that achieved the historical highest 
ever growth rate among the agricultural subsectors experienced contraction in 
1997-2001. This past five years may be the worst record of agricultural 
performance since early 1970’s.What is wrong in the agricultural sector ?. 
 From Table 1 we can also see that the main source of production growth 
during the 1967-1986 period was productivity. This is especially true during the 
peak growth period in 1978-1986. Productivity growth rate dropped drastically 
during the 1986-1997 and was even negative during the 1997-2001. We may say 
that the present persistently low agricultural growth rate was due to declining 
productivity, both land and labor productivity. Why the agricultural sector plaque 
with land productivity regression syndrom?  This can happen because agricultural 
resource base has been degradating while technology was saturated. 
 A more rigorous study conducted by Fuglie (2003) confirms the growth 
pattern. During the 1990-2000 period, land productivity contracted by 0.9 percent 
per year, dropped from growing at 2.6 percent per year during the 1968-1992 
period. Labor productivity growth dropped from 3.1 percent per year during the 
1993-2003. He found that the sharp dropped in agricultural growth rate during the 
1993-2000 period was due to sharp dropped of both total utilized input, slowed 
down from 2.4 percent per year in the 1968-1992 periode to 1.0 percent per year 
during the 1993-2000 period, and total factor productivity that slowed down from 
growing at 2.2 percent per year during the 1968-1992 to only at 0.1 percent per 
year during the 1993-2000 period. 
 It can be concluded that technological innovation in Indonesia’s 
agriculture has been stagnant since early 1990’s. In addition, Fuglie (2003) also 
presumed that the decline in total factor productivity was due to the downward 
trend in public spending for agricultural development since mind-1980’s. Public 
spending for agricultural development, is critically important for Indonesia’s, 
particularly because of the dominant roles of government in both research and 
extension services (Fuglie, 1999). On the vital roles of public infrastructure for 
agricultural growth rate was also confirmed by Mundlak, Larson and Butze 
(2002). 
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Commodity Production 
 Some more revealing explanations about the seemingly persistent 
stagnation of the agricultural production can be obtained by analyzing commodity 
production growth profiles. Since agricultural commodities are numerous, it is too 
burden some to cover all commodities in this review. Some major commodities 
representing food crops, vegetables, fruits and estate crops have been chosen. Our 
focus is land based agriculture, excluding livestock and fisheries. 
 Paddy (rice), maize and soybean are chosen to represent food crops. The 
growth production patterns of the three major food crops were very much similar, 
just like the food crop sub sector GDP, they accelerated during the second half of 
the 1970’s to the first half of the 1980’s and then decelerated rapidly. Since mid 
1980’s the food crop production has been trapped in a peristently low growth rate 
(Table 2). Rice only grew at rate of less than one percent per year, far below the 
population growth rate at 1.63 percent per year. Maize production growth rate was 
about equal to the population growth rate. The worst was soybean performance 
which has been contracting rapidly since early 1990’s. Clearly, food crop 
productions have been growing far behind their demand. They must have been 
facing stiff supply constraints since mid 1980’s. 
 
Table 2. Trend of Harvested Area (Ha), Yield (Ton/Ha) and Production (Ton) for Food Crops in Indonesia, 
1970-20031) 
 
Description 
1970-
1975 
1976-
1980 
1981-
1985 
1986-
1990 
1991-
1995 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2003 
Paddy 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
8,311,790 
(0.96) 
2.88 
(-4.58) 
23,870,032 
(-3.62) 
 
8,693,225 
(1.98) 
2.95 
(4.02) 
25,650,723 
(6.00) 
 
9,439,727 
(1.91) 
3.78 
(2.87) 
35,741,831 
(4.77) 
 
10,214,553 
(1.59) 
4.13 
(2.07) 
42,241,262 
(3.66) 
 
10,914,041 
(1.79) 
4.35 
(-0.01) 
47,431,835 
(1.79) 
 
11,602,427 
(0.78) 
4.33 
(-0.48) 
50,257,539 
(0.30) 
 
11,495,509 
(-0.13) 
4.43 
(1.06) 
50,981,489 
(0.93) 
Maize 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
2,711,693 
(-1.17) 
1.06 
(4.14) 
2,862,704 
(2.96) 
 
2,602,947 
(5.44) 
1.32 
(4.80) 
3,447,395 
(10.24) 
 
2,708,956 
(0.21) 
1.65 
(3.92) 
4,470,312 
(4.13) 
 
3,055,367 
(1.24) 
1.98 
(3.02) 
6,055,492 
(4.26) 
 
3,261,029 
(2.63) 
2.16 
(1.38) 
7,040,058 
(4.01) 
 
3,580,655 
(-1.05) 
2.61 
(2.69) 
9,353,792 
(1.64) 
 
3,204,475 
(-1.22) 
2.96 
(2.90) 
9,495,566 
(1.68) 
Soybean 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
721,275 
(2.22) 
0.75 
(1.49) 
541,593 
(3.71) 
 
708,411 
(4.43) 
0.84 
(2.63) 
597,913 
(7.06) 
 
762,543 
(5.48) 
0.88 
(2.62) 
678,020 
(8.10) 
 
1,213,578 
(2.15) 
1.06 
(2.99) 
1,284,872 
(5.14) 
 
1,478,427 
(-0.21) 
1.13 
(-0.05) 
1,667,421 
(-0.26) 
 
1,094,344 
(-8.53) 
1.19 
(0.54) 
1,304,501 
(-7.98) 
 
610,923 
(-5.54) 
1.20 
(0.08) 
731.994 
(-5.46) 
1) Figure in parenthesis are the annual growth rate of harvested area, yield or production. 
Sources:  Basis data from CBS, Jakarta (various years). 
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 If we look at the sources of the food crop production growths, we clearly 
see that the common reasons for the emerging decelerating growth phenomenon 
since early 1990’s are: (1) deceleration leading to contraction of harvested area, 
and (2) yield deceleration  leading to stagnation of land productivity (yield). For 
food crops that have short age to maturity, the harvested area arises from both 
arable land size and cropping intensity. The decelerating harvested area, thus, can 
be due to both arable land size or cropping intensity deceleration. Unfortunately, 
we do not have data available to compute cropping intensity except for wetland 
(sawah) rice. Further decomposition of the rice production produced from the 
wetland rice field (sawah) should give more revealing explantions about the 
production constraints (Table 3). 
 
Table 3.  Sources of Wetland Rice Production Growth in Indonesia, 1981-2000 
 
Region 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 
Java 
     a. Land size 
     b. Cropping intensity 
     c. Yield 
 
-0.32 
1.89 
2.80 
 
-0.15 
0.86 
2.29 
 
-0.42 
0.88 
1.37 
 
-1.04 
2.78 
-1.29 
Total 4.37 3.30 1.83 0.45 
Outside Java 
     a. Land size 
     b. Cropping intensity 
     c. Yield 
 
0.74 
2.23 
2.66 
 
2.56 
0.34 
1.75 
 
1.46 
1.32 
0.38 
 
-4.04 
.5,47 
-0.27 
Total 5.63 4.65 3.16 1.16 
Indonesia 
     a. Land size 
     b. Cropping intensity 
     c. Yield 
 
0.22 
1.94 
2.66 
 
1.40 
0.30 
1.93 
 
0.70 
0.88 
0.79 
 
-2.83 
4.41 
-0.83 
Total 4.82 3.63 2.37 0.75 
 
 It is interesting to note that the wet land rice field (sawah) in Java has been 
decelerating since early 1980’s. The whole source of the growth of rice harvested 
area in Java came from cropping intensity that increased rapidly, out compensate 
the declining land size. In outside Java, the wetland paddy field accelerated in 
1980’s, and then decelerated in 1990’s. Since mid 1990’s, arable wetland paddy 
field has been declining both in Java and outside Java. Since the 1990’s, the sole 
source of rice production growth has been cropping intensity. 
 It can be concluded therefore, that the most stringent rice production 
constraints are: (1) declining arable land, and (2) declining yield (land 
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productivity). The sole source of rice production growth since mid 1990’s has 
been cropping intensity. This conclusion may very well be valid for many other 
food crops with short age to maturity, such as, maize, beans, peanuts, etc., since 
they also mostly planted in wetland paddy field. 
 This is really an alarming problem. The cropping intensity potential is 
quite limited and very difficult to expand. It can be saturated very fast. Since both 
land size and productivity continue declining, it is realistic to predict that the 
present persistent stagnation of food crop production will be worsening in the 
future. This may cause devastative blow not only to the agricultural sector, but 
also to rural economies and to the whole Indonesian economy as well. This very 
critical problem calls for an immediate and decisive policy response from the 
government. 
 Production performance of vegetable crops was really spectacular during 
1970 to mid 1990’s. Some crops even enjoyed double digits production growth 
rate. But in second half of the 1990’s, the growth rates of all the vegetable crops 
dropped drastically and continued decelerating. During the 2000 – 2001 the 
vegetable production growth rates almost all negative, except for cucumber. 
Again, the unmediate causes of the decelerating production growth phenomen are 
either stagnant or declining of both harvested area and yield (Table 4). 
 The fruit production growth rates are generally highly fluctuative. Like 
vegetable production, fruit productions declined significantly in the second half of 
1990’s (Table 5). The best performance of fruit production was in the first half of 
the 1990’s. The fruit production performance in recent years was generally poor. 
Again, the main reasons are either stagnation or decelerating of both harvested 
area and yield. 
 Estate crops production performance varies by commodities. The best 
performance achieved by palm oil and cocoa which grew consistent at double 
digits rates during the 1970-1995 period. The major source of the production 
growth was harvested area. As a whole, the estate crop productions decelerated 
since early 1990’s (Table 6). The primary reasons are the sharp declining of 
harvested area growth rates combined with stagnant or declining yield. 
 It should be noted that estate crops are perennial with long age to maturity 
and their productions require large investment with long gestation period. 
Availability of long-term investment credits with reasonable interest rate is the key 
for expanding the estate crop production base, harvested area in particular. The 
persistent decelerating estate crop production since early 1990’s may be largely 
due to internal capital and external credit constraints. 
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Table 4. Trend of Harvested Area (ha), Yield (ton/ha) and Production (ton) for Vegetables in Indonesia, 
1970-20021) 
 
Description 1970-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 2000-02 
Shallot 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
41,391 
(0.82) 
4.47 
(-5.31) 
184,867 
(04.49) 
 
46,715 
(5.81) 
4.27 
(-0.34) 
199,178 
(5.48) 
 
58,370 
(7.78) 
4.41 
(6.61) 
261,545 
(14.39) 
 
65,718 
(-0.62) 
6.30 
(5.48) 
413,738 
(4.86) 
 
75,372 
(3.73) 
7.50 
(1.17) 
565,600 
(4.91) 
 
89,931 
(-1.09) 
8.17 
(5.57) 
736,955 
(4.49) 
 
88,553 
(2.53) 
8.75 
(-2.58) 
773,190 
(-0.05) 
Potato 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
17,393 
(4.35) 
6.93 
(4.56) 
122,463 
(8.90) 
 
22,902 
(3.81) 
9.33 
(2.27) 
213,912 
(6.08) 
 
29,305 
(6.06) 
9.17 
(13.36) 
273,753 
(19.42) 
 
38,357 
(5.58) 
12.54 
(5.43) 
484,307 
(11,02) 
 
51,608 
(10.46) 
15.15 
(5.31) 
790,057 
(15.77) 
 
64,205 
(3.11) 
15.10 
(-4.37) 
964,473 
(-1.26) 
 
66,335 
(-13.91) 
13.93 
(5.39) 
918,647 
(-8.52) 
Cabbage 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
18,238 
(10.37) 
11.05 
(0.26) 
201,683 
(10.63) 
 
26,140 
(4.58) 
11.66 
(1.63) 
305,587 
(6.21) 
 
38,487 
(5.47) 
12.16 
(14.52) 
474,478 
(19.99) 
 
62,783 
(-14.92) 
16.08 
(16.79) 
939,402 
(1.87) 
 
65,791 
(13.14) 
20.58 
(1.54) 
1,355,228 
(14.96) 
 
96,134 
(1.43) 
17.14 
(-3.83) 
1,646,422 
(-2.40) 
 
86,049 
(-27.11) 
18.00 
(14.87) 
1,508,003 
(-12.25) 
Tomato 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
11,909 
(9.39) 
3.15 
(26.28) 
40,150 
(35.67) 
 
18,584 
(16.66) 
4.95 
(-4.55) 
90,672 
(12.11) 
 
34,427 
(14.30) 
3.61 
(-4.82) 
122,685 
(9.47) 
 
54,255 
(3.47) 
3.80 
(3.51) 
198,076 
(6.99) 
 
46,752 
(3.21) 
6.95 
(19.95) 
328,797 
(23.16) 
 
46,392 
(-1.36) 
11.87 
(3.41) 
551,039 
(2.06) 
 
45,272 
(0.09) 
13.13 
(-0.35) 
594,571 
(-0.26) 
Carrots 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
2,621 
(14.13) 
7.22 
(6.50) 
19,399 
(20.63) 
 
4,198 
(18.90) 
7.76 
(5.70) 
32,089 
(24.59) 
 
6,248 
(5.30) 
9.09 
(0.66) 
56,781 
(5.96) 
 
12,074 
(10.83) 
12.17 
(2.18) 
147,557 
(13.01) 
 
16,127 
(6.58) 
13.36 
(0.62) 
216,007 
(7.20) 
 
19,154 
(0.73) 
15.02 
(5.41) 
288,647 
(6.14) 
 
19,688 
(-1.48) 
15.52 
(-2.81) 
305.642 
(-4.28) 
Chilli 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
103,329 
(1.38) 
2.35 
(7.93) 
244,192 
(9.32) 
 
106,899 
(0.13) 
1.97 
(1.39) 
210,267 
(1.52) 
 
181,734 
(21.45) 
1.63 
(-6.69) 
269,879 
(14.76) 
 
235,086 
(-7.35) 
1.94 
(8.04) 
451,838 
(0.69) 
 
178,671 
(-2.48) 
3.46 
(25.59) 
624,379 
(23.11) 
 
172,931 
(2.98) 
5.43 
(-1.55) 
940.375 
(1.43) 
 
185,060 
(1.24) 
5.41 
(-4.37) 
1,000,003 
(-3.13) 
Cucumber 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
24,704 
(6.43) 
5.09 
(9.82) 
128,786 
(16.25) 
 
32,418 
(16.44) 
5.38 
(-14.21) 
165,786 
(2.24) 
 
47,293 
(10.68) 
3.85 
(-1.60) 
182,786 
(9.07) 
 
75,831 
(-0.92) 
3.97 
(0.06) 
289,504 
(-0.86) 
 
55,624 
(0.72) 
7.58 
(23,21) 
423,193 
(23.92) 
 
52,182 
(-3,63) 
9.52 
(-3.85) 
498,563 
(-7.48) 
 
51,667 
(3.92) 
9.10 
(-0.70) 
470,046 
(3.23) 
1) Figure in parenthesis are the annual growth rate of harvested area, yield or production. 
Source:  Basis data from CBS, Jakarta (various years). 
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Table 5. Trend of Harvested Area (ha), Yield (ton/ha) and Production (ton) for Fruits in Indonesia, 1970-20021) 
 
Description 1970-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 2000-02 
Avocade 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
6,383 
(9.35) 
6.46 
(4.30) 
41.367 
(13.65) 
 
11,994 
(-5.95) 
3.96 
(3.10) 
46.798 
(-2.84) 
 
16,936 
(5.38) 
3.46 
(-6.96) 
58.060 
(-1.57) 
 
19,420 
(11.25) 
3.52 
(-6.98) 
67,223 
(4.27) 
 
28,877 
(4.28) 
3.72 
(8.15) 
108,685 
(12.43) 
 
37,576 
(-8.62) 
3.68 
(8.72) 
135,266 
(0.10) 
 
36,558 
(5.13) 
4.10 
(-3.46) 
149,529 
(1.67) 
Banana 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
289,600 
(10.33) 
6.76 
(-7.22) 
1,889,38
3 
(3.12) 
 
174,284 
(-0.03) 
9.24 
(9.07) 
1,584,47
0 
(9.04) 
 
176,977 
(-2,14) 
11.07 
(0.41) 
1,955,22
1 
(-1.73) 
 
147,190 
(-4.41) 
15.82 
(4.40) 
2,303,15
3 
(-0.01) 
 
208,113 
(19.34) 
14.63 
(-9.19) 
2,931,71
3 
(10.15) 
 
264,535 
(3.19) 
12.37 
(2.09) 
3,276,02
6 
(5.28) 
 
284,002 
(-0.35) 
13.06 
(-0.51) 
3,708,73
0 
(-0.86) 
Manggo 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
53,300 
(3.22) 
6.34 
(-3.06) 
335.267 
(0.16) 
 
73,436 
(-2.88) 
3.86 
(9.84) 
278.453 
(6.96) 
 
87.000 
(2.47) 
4.68 
(3.97) 
407,638 
(6.44) 
 
110,838 
(5.57) 
4.36 
(-2.48) 
481.370 
(3.09) 
 
150.966 
(3.79) 
4.14 
(597) 
628.521 
(9.76) 
 
161.764 
(0.65) 
5.12 
(-1.15) 
834,711 
(-0.50) 
 
164,657 
(1.19) 
5.29 
(-0.31) 
870,607 
(0.88) 
Orange 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
30,683 
(1.64) 
4.83 
(7.33) 
148,067 
(8.97) 
 
33,477 
(4.90) 
6.44 
(8.30) 
216,238 
(13.20) 
 
60,010 
(10.78) 
7.92 
(-5.78) 
467,602 
(5.00) 
 
67,443 
(-14.12) 
6.17 
(-11.05) 
429,041 
(-25.17) 
 
64,413 
(11.28) 
7.13 
(9.58) 
481,428 
(20.86) 
 
111.369 
(-8.91) 
5.51 
(3.06) 
612,364 
(-5.85) 
 
98,657 
(9.52) 
5.81 
(-7.97) 
573,409 
(1.55) 
Papaya 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
31,383 
(4.04) 
8.72 
(-10.84) 
269,483 
(-6.80) 
 
22,636 
(10.55) 
11.27 
(-2.88) 
253,278 
(7.66) 
 
30,935 
(-5.37) 
8.96 
(-0.24) 
276,533 
(-5.61) 
 
31,674 
(-7.38) 
10.62 
(9.54) 
330,874 
(2.16) 
 
32,244 
(9.28) 
13.25 
(-0.03) 
427,825 
(9.25) 
 
34,199 
(1.98) 
12.34 
(2.57) 
422,308 
(4.55) 
 
37,131 
(3.61) 
12.84 
(3.16) 
477,205 
(6.76) 
Pineapple 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
22,517 
(10.65) 
4.85 
(-1.73) 
107,517 
(8.92) 
 
27,068 
(3.25) 
6.38 
(11.35) 
171,433 
(14.60) 
 
44,788 
(16.47) 
7.19 
(-1.51) 
318,858 
(14.96) 
 
46,903 
(-6.73) 
7.23 
(2.16) 
339,451 
(-4.57) 
 
46,862 
(6.95) 
9.47 
(4.78) 
451,850 
(11.72) 
 
40.865 
(0.01) 
9.40 
(-6.83) 
384,781 
(-6.82) 
 
43,069 
(2.56) 
10.10 
(5.56) 
435,307 
(8.12) 
1) Figure in parenthesis are the annual growth rate of harvested area, yield or production. 
Source:  Basic data from CBS, Jakarta (various years). 
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Table 6. Trend of Harvested Area (ha), Yield (ton/ha) and Production (ton) for Estate Crops in Indonesia, 
1970-20001) 
 
Description 1970-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 
Tea 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
103,383 
(-2.04) 
0.63 
(4.19) 
64,629 
(2.15) 
 
103,866 
(3.38) 
0.87 
(5.49) 
90,439 
(8.87) 
 
114,035 
(3.38) 
0.99 
(2.82) 
113,218 
(6.21) 
 
126,102 
(1.15) 
1.07 
(2.39) 
135,334 
(3.53) 
 
142,350 
(3.19) 
1.06 
(-2.20) 
150,290 
(0.99) 
 
150,451 
(2.49) 
1.08 
(-2.85) 
162,696 
(-0.36) 
Palm Oil 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
158,800 
(7.37) 
1.77 
(5.43) 
284,142 
(12.81) 
 
247,424 
(8.35) 
2.21 
(5.32) 
550,462 
(13.67) 
 
432,779 
(16.94) 
2.39 
(-5.55) 
1,012,097 
(11.39) 
 
859,701 
(15.27) 
2.09 
(-1.02) 
1,789,417 
(14.26) 
 
1,644,158 
(10.76) 
2.16 
(1.73) 
3,566,606 
(12.49) 
 
2,740,844 
(8.57) 
2.02 
(-2.72) 
5,504,993 
(5.84) 
Rubber 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
2,333,074 
(-0.01) 
0.35 
(0.33) 
805.628 
(0.31) 
 
2,355,402 
(1.06) 
0.39 
(3.64) 
915,889 
(4.70) 
 
2,597,705 
(3.45) 
0.38 
(-0.25) 
991,399 
(3.20) 
 
2,973,087 
(2.48) 
0.40 
(0.91) 
1,180,223 
(3.39) 
 
3,367,288 
(2.47) 
0.43 
(1.61) 
1,454,957 
(4.08) 
 
3,600,959 
(1.76) 
0.46 
(1.37) 
1,650,980 
(3.13) 
Sugar Cane 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
153,820 
(8.83) 
7.03 
(-2.91) 
1,068,800 
(5.91) 
 
270,211 
(12.10) 
5.12 
(-14.37) 
1,324,411 
(-2.27) 
 
355,224 
(0.95) 
4.62 
(10.70) 
1,637,128 
(9.75) 
 
349,574 
(2.88) 
5.98 
(-2.18) 
2,084,486 
(0.70) 
 
416,158 
(3.01) 
5.49 
(-4.19) 
2,280,484 
(-1.17) 
 
378,674 
(-6.64) 
4.73 
(-1.48) 
1,791,677 
(-8.12) 
Cocoa 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
15,702 
(6.68) 
0.15 
(8.93) 
2.412 
(15.61) 
 
27,137 
(22.59) 
0.24 
(1.87) 
6,506 
(24.46) 
 
64,528 
(20.23) 
0.34 
(2.96) 
22,067 
(23.19) 
 
239,648 
(32.01) 
0.34 
(4.33) 
83,343 
(36.34) 
 
534,897 
(7.94) 
0.45 
(5.78) 
242,797 
(13.72) 
 
584,250 
(-1.41) 
0.67 
(4.75) 
391,067 
(3.34) 
Coffee 
    - Harvested area 
 
    - Yield 
 
    - Production 
 
 
395,892 
(-0.45) 
0.43 
(-2.85) 
169,181 
(-3.30) 
 
557,996 
(11.76) 
0.42 
(0.13) 
235,738 
(11.89) 
 
848,040 
(4.19) 
0.36 
(-3.27) 
305,717 
(0.92) 
 
1,005,837 
(3.44) 
0.39 
(-0.21) 
390,080 
(3.23) 
 
1,141,843 
(0.89) 
0.39 
(0.74) 
442,407 
(1.63) 
 
1,152,936 
(-0.57) 
0.42 
(4.46) 
484,750 
(3.89) 
1) Figure in parenthesis are the annual growth rate of harvested area, yield or production. 
Source:  Basic data from CBS, Jakarta (various years). 
 
Distribution Constraints 
 In this review, although it might not be perfect the distribution constraints 
of agricultural products are identified through consumer – producer price margin. 
The price margin can be considered reflecting marketing efficiency which in turn 
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reflective distributional efficiency. More stringent distribution constraints should 
be reflected in higher or increasing price margin. Price margin in percentage is 
comparable between commodities, whereas its real value is comparable overtime 
for the same commodity. The price margin for some agricultural commodities are 
presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7.  Price Margin of Agriculture Commodities in Indonesia, 1986 - 2002 (Rp/kg) 
 
Year Paddy Maize 
Soy-
bean 
Potato 
Cab-
bage 
Shal-
lot 
Papaya 
Bana-
na 
Orange Coffee 
1986-1990 
- Nominal 
- Real *) 
- Percentage 
 
150 
260 
38.4 
 
  96 
169 
32.2 
 
144 
251 
16.3 
 
160 
282 
32.6 
 
144 
253 
52.6 
 
361 
632 
36.2 
 
30 
50 
10.0 
 
253 
443 
56.3 
 
433 
764 
39.3 
 
2233 
3970 
51.9 
1991-1995 
- Nominal 
- Real *) 
- Percentage 
 
265 
311 
41.4 
 
172 
199 
35.7 
 
323 
384 
24.1 
 
263 
307 
32.8 
 
296 
345 
58.5 
 
759 
857 
40.4 
 
15 
17 
3.5 
 
371 
435 
55.6 
 
605 
722 
34.5 
 
2585 
3095 
48.7 
1996-2000 
- Nominal 
- Real *) 
- Percentage 
 
722 
387 
43.7 
 
831 
440 
52.9 
 
1649 
  840 
37.8 
 
1467 
  772 
42.5 
 
1014 
  547 
59.2 
 
3481 
1812 
49.9 
 
109 
  57 
13.0 
 
1136 
  623 
63.7 
 
809 
433 
21.5 
 
10604 
  5404 
   61.1 
2000-2002 
- Nominal 
- Real *) 
- Percentage 
 
1095 
  432 
45.5 
 
784 
311 
39.8 
 
1116 
  445 
28.0 
 
575 
232 
18.4 
 
662 
266 
28.8 
 
4618 
1822 
46.0 
 
188 
  74 
16.0 
 
1172 
  464 
53.8 
 
1571 
  618 
29.3 
 
18332 
  7336 
   73.7 
Source:  Producers and Consumers Statistics (various year) 
*)  Deflated by consumer price index. 
 
  During the 1986-2000 period, the price margins were large (except for 
papaya). Not only large, the price margins grew with an accelerating rate. The 
growing price margins, then showed reversal trend or decelerated in 2000 – 2002 
period. The real value and the percentage price margins declined significantly for 
some commodities such as maize, soybean, potato, cabbage and banana. Although 
continued increasing, the growth rates of the price margins were declining for 
those commodities. 
 Based on the size and trend of the price margins, we may conclude that 
during the 1990’s, marketing distribution constraints were stringent. This may be 
one of the reasons why agricultural production performance during the period 
drastically dropped and continued worsening. There is also an indication that the 
distribution systems has been improving since 2000. We must remind the readers, 
however, this conclusion is tentative. The agricultural commodity distribution is 
quite complex, better understanding of which requires a comprehensive study. 
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WHAT ARE THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEMS ? 
 
 We have find that the agriculture has, indeed, been facing some stringent 
supply constraints both in production and distribution systems. The general 
production constraints are land availability and land productivity stagnation. 
Distribution systems remain inefficient as shown by large price margins, and for 
some commodities the margins tend increasing. This reflects a high transaction 
cost of the agricultural commodities. These conclusions are too general for 
formulating appropriate and workable policy responses. We must identify the root 
causes of the constraints 
 
Declining arable land 
 The fact that available land availability is the most stringent constraint for 
Indonesian agriculture should not be a surprise. Available potential agricultural 
land is fixed by nature, its conversion to arable land is costly whereas its 
conversion to non agriculture functions continues accelerating due to both high 
population growth, income growth and rapid development of hand demanding 
infrastructures, economic and social facilities. 
 Overall for Indonesia, total agriculture land still continued increasing, 
except in 1991 – 1995 period. But this was only true for outside Java. Total 
agricultural land in Java has been declining with an increasing rate since early 
1990’s, while in outside Java is accelerating except in 1991 - 1995 period. 
Agricultural land in Java is known best for food crops. Land productivity and land 
use intensity in Java are higher than in outside Java. This regional pattern of 
growth of agricultural land must imply significant change in regional structure of 
Indonesia agriculture. The future growth of Indonesian agriculture will be in 
outside Java. The historical dominant role of Java in food production will be 
fading gradually. 
 The decelerating trend of total agriculture land is fairly reasonable. In one 
hand, potential agricultural land for new land expansion is only available in 
outside Java. On the other hand, agricultural land conversion to other functions 
will continue accelerating both in Java and outside Java. The pace of the 
agricultural land conversion is much faster in Java particularly due to its faster 
expansion of land demanding infrastructure development, urbanization and 
industrial complexes. These can be considered natural forces that will always be 
there as long as the economy grows and expands and the population increases 
(Simatupang and Irawan, 2002; Simatupang, et al., 2002). Agricultural land 
conversion, particularly in Java, will continue accelerating. 
 Of the most alarming one is the decelerating growth of wet paddy field 
(sawah) both in Java (since the data coverage in early 1980’s) and in outside Java 
(since mid 1990’s). Wet paddy field, the irrigated in particular, is the best type of 
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land for rice farming. It can also be used for other food and vegetable crops. It can 
be used for multiple cropping per year. The declining wet land area is the main 
reason for the decelerating growth of harvested area of rice, and other food crops, 
and some horticultural crops which can also be planted in that land. 
 
Table 8.  Trend of Agriculture Land Size in Indonesia, 1981 – 2001 (Ha)1) 
 
Year 
Dryland 
for 
garden 
Grazing 
land 
Brackish 
water 
pond 
Fresh 
water 
pond 
Tempo-
rary 
fallow 
Estate 
plan-
tation 
Wet 
paddy 
field 
(sawah) 
Total 
Java 
1981-1985 
 
1985-1990 
    
1991-1995 
 
1996-2000 
 
2000-2001 
     
 
3081287 
(1.12) 
3138582 
(0.27) 
3090222 
(-0.48) 
3091928 
(0.34) 
3109630 
(-0.18) 
 
64074 
(-7.80) 
58489 
(-5.60) 
44470 
(-1.57) 
41163 
(-1.31) 
39181 
(-6.29) 
 
91661 
(3.97) 
104158 
(6.56) 
116398 
(0.73) 
129581 
(0.72) 
127560 
(-7.54) 
 
33867 
(-5.76) 
33123 
(0.47) 
33533 
(3.19) 
35990 
(-1.23) 
37757 
(13.18) 
 
89478 
(0.73) 
104494 
(-2.20) 
81630 
(-1.16) 
66316 
(-0.83) 
66148 
(-2.22) 
 
596982 
(0.47) 
659472 
(1.06) 
627971 
(-0.64) 
624106 
(-1.33) 
598116 
(-0.82) 
 
3465827 
(-0.3) 
3440319 
(-0.15) 
3406591 
(-0.42) 
3302807 
(-1.04) 
3144272 
(-0.45) 
 
7423175 
(0.30) 
7538636 
(0.16) 
7400815 
(-0.42) 
7291890 
(-0.42) 
7122662 
(-0.43) 
Off Java 
1981-1985 
 
1985-1990 
    
1991-1995 
 
1996-2000 
 
2000-2001 
     
 
8692962 
(5.31) 
9701186 
(2.20) 
8687990 
(-3.46) 
8791678 
(4.17) 
9947388 
(2.46) 
 
3515795 
(1.43) 
2902970 
(-1.46) 
2087170 
(-8.26) 
2090793 
(4.22) 
2147790 
(-1.93) 
 
105297 
(0.89) 
149869 
(11.08) 
231930 
(14.35) 
336875 
(2.52) 
342392 
(-10.62) 
 
126564 
(1.16) 
94644 
(3.22) 
142657 
(4.38) 
142750 
(1.79) 
153971 
(6.23) 
 
8749942 
(3.47) 
9497377 
(-0.61) 
7485896 
(-6.48) 
8436616 
(8.72) 
9465221 
(-4.01) 
 
7897812 
(4.62) 
9470088 
(6.66) 
11799276 
(4.91) 
15226920 
(4.08) 
17729752 
(17.92) 
 
4033948 
(0.74) 
4623099 
(2.56) 
4999672 
(1.46) 
4553616 
(-4.04) 
4530306 
(-4.96) 
 
33122320 
(3.58) 
36439233 
(2.45) 
35434590 
(-0.78) 
39579247 
(4.09) 
44316818 
(7.20) 
Indonesia 
1981-1985 
 
1985-1990 
    
1991-1995 
 
1996-2000 
 
2000-2001 
     
 
11774249 
(4.05) 
12839768 
(1.73) 
11778211 
(-2.69) 
11883606 
(3.20) 
13057017 
(1.83) 
 
3579868 
(1.25) 
2961459 
(-1.54) 
2131640 
(-8.12) 
2131956 
(4.11) 
2186971 
(-2.01) 
 
196958 
(2.11) 
254027 
(8.98) 
348328 
(9.79) 
466455 
(2.01) 
469952 
(-9.78) 
 
160431 
(-0.42) 
127767 
(2.52) 
176189 
(4.13) 
178740 
(1.18) 
191728 
(7.60) 
 
8839420 
(3.44) 
9601871 
(-0.63) 
7567526 
(-6.40) 
8502932 
(8.66) 
9531369 
(-3.97) 
 
8494794 
(4.32) 
10129559 
(6.30) 
12427247 
(4.63) 
15851026 
(3.87 
18327868 
(17.30) 
 
7499775 
(0.22) 
8063418 
(1.40) 
8406263 
(0.70) 
7856422 
(-2.83) 
7674577 
(-2.74) 
 
40545495 
(2.94) 
43977869 
(2.06) 
42835405 
(-0.72) 
46871137 
(3.40) 
51439480 
(6.15) 
1) Figure in parenthesis are the annual growth rate. 
Source:  Statistical Year Book (various year). 
 
 The total dry land for gardening was decelerating during the 1985 – 1990, 
contracting during the 1990 – 1995 period, but then and retaining its high growth 
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in mid 1990’s. In Java, however, the dry land has been declining since early 
1990’s, due to conversion for other types or agricultural land and non-agriculture 
functions. Significant portion of the dry land expansion in outside Java has been 
the results of agricultural development through transmigration program. 
 Total land allocated for estate crops continued increasing with a very high 
growth rate. The growth rate was slowing down during the 1990’s but it was 
seeming accelerated again in early 2000’s. Regionally, the gain in land plantation 
wholly occurred in outside Java. In fact in Java, land for plantation has been 
continuously declining sice early 1990’s. The rapid development of estate crops 
area in outside Java was largely the results of heavy government investments 
through its Nuclear Estate development program and private corporate investment 
with concessional credit facilities from the government. 
 For the future, agricultural land in Java will continue decelerating. For one 
hand, new agricultural land development is impossible because the potential has 
been exhausted. On the other hand, land conversion to non agriculture will 
continue accelerating along with population and economic development. This can 
be considered as natural phenomenon which can not be stopped, but may be 
control able to slow the pace of its deceleration and to smoothen its impacts. 
 The remaining hope is expansion of agricultural land development in 
outside Java where the potential for new land development is still quite large. The 
most stringent obstacles are lacking of infrastructures, transportation systems, 
electricity, etc., and capital investments. Government direct involvement and 
facilitation for private investment is necessary for reversing the decelerating trend 
of agriculture land. 
 
Lacking of technological innovations 
 Most agricultural crops have faced either land productivity deceleration or 
stagnation since the second half of the 1980’s. This can be explained by either 
lacking of land enhancing technological innovation and or land quality 
degradation. The lacking of land enhancing technological innovation can be 
further broken down to either lacking of technological break through at research 
and development (R & D) level, technological dissemination bottleneck between 
R & D institutions and farmers, and sub-optimal technological practice. 
 
Research and development (R & D) 
 Lacking of new technological creation at the R & D institution may be the 
most critical restraint for most agricultural crops. Indonesia R & D systems is 
heavily dominated by the government (Fuglie, 1999). The government R & D 
programs have been heavily biased for food crops. As we can see from Table 9, 
most of the released high yielding varieties (HYV) are food crops, rice in 
particular. The inexistent or limited research and development may be the main 
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reason why land productivity of almost all non food crop productions remain low 
and tend decelerating (Table 9). 
 Even for food crops, the main focus of the public R & D, there has been 
seemingly saturation in technological break through. Based on yield potential, 
there has been no significant R & D break through since mid 1990’s. This is true 
for all agricultural crops. We may conclude, recession in R & D systems is one of 
the critical bottleneck of the agriculture supply. 
 
Table 9. Average Yield Potential of New High Yielding Varieties (NHYV) in Indonesia, 1970-2003 
(ton/ha) 
 
Crops 
1970-
1975 
1976-
1980 
1981-
1985 
1986-
1990 
1991-
1995 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2003 
A. Food Crops 
    1. Wetland Rice 
    2. Dryland Rice 
    3. Maize 
    4. Soybean 
 
5.00(3) 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
1.80(1) 
 
4.80(11) 
3.80  (2) 
4.00  (3) 
n.d.a 
 
4.80(21) 
3.30  (6) 
5.00  (8) 
1.40  (6) 
 
5.00(7) 
3.50(6) 
5.90(5) 
1.50(8) 
 
5.70  (8) 
3.60  (6) 
5.20(11) 
1.80(13) 
 
6.50(14) 
4.00  (2) 
8.80(26) 
1.80  (5) 
 
6.20(13) 
3.20 (2) 
8.10 (2) 
1.80 (5) 
B. Fruits 
    1. Avocade 
    2. Orange 
    3. Manggo 
    4. Pineapple 
    5. Papaya 
    6. Banana 
 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
4.60 (3) 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
 
5.00(3) 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
2.00 
6.30(1) 
n.d.a 
19.00(1) 
 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
3.50(5) 
5.40(2) 
16.20)2_ 
 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
C. Vegetables 
    1. Shallot 
    2. Chilli 
    3. Potato 
    4. Cabbage 
    5. Tomato 
    6. Cucumber 
 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
 
9.20(4) 
n.d.a 
26.70(2) 
n.d.a 
14.50 
n.d.a 
 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
25.00(1) 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
 
n.d.a 
19.30(7) 
26.50(1) 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
 
15.50 (2) 
21.00(12) 
22.00 (2) 
54.90 (5) 
55.00(16) 
n.d.a 
 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
40.0(17) 
D. Estate Crops 
    1. Tea 
    2. Palm Oil 
    3. Rubber 
    4. Sugar Cane 
    5. Cocoa 
    6. Coffee 
 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
113.80(14) 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
1.40(12) 
99.40(12) 
n.d.a 
2.00  (2) 
 
5.00(11) 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
27.00 (4) 
2.40 (7) 
1.60 (5) 
 
n.d.a 
27.90 (4) 
  1.80 (3) 
n.d.a 
n.d.a 
2.20(10) 
Source: National Seeds Agency (various year) 
Figure in parenthesis is the number of varieties. 
 
Technology delivery systems 
 Technology delivery systems, that links the R & D systems in the 
upstream and the farmers in the downstream of the innovation systems may be 
another critical bottleneck. This includes seeds and other input embodied 
technology multiplication and dissemination. The technology delivery systems has 
been very much dominated by the government. Just like R & D, the government 
has been very much focused on food crops, rice in particular, farming 
technologies. 
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 The government has developed an integrated rice technology delivery 
systems during the 1970 to late 1980’s period. For seed multiplication, the 
government built seed production centers at provincial level. An integrated 
national extension service was also developed by building field extension offices 
(Balai Penyuluhan Pertanian) in all sub districts (kecamatan) and asssigning field 
extension servants (Penyuluh Pertanian Lapangan) for all villages. The 
government also developed village cooperatives to distributes all farm inputs in 
village level. The overall system is centrally coordinated by the so called Mass 
Guidance Coordinating Board (Bimbingan Massal = BIMAS), headed by the 
President at national level, Governor at provincial level, Bupati at district level, 
Camat at sub-district level and Village chief at village level. This centralized 
command system was proven quite effective in delivering input embodied 
technologies from research institutes to farmers. 
 But now, the technology delivery systems has been deconstructed and 
become disarrayed. Extension service system decentralized and handed out to the 
district governments. This should theoretically good, but in reality the district 
governments are not all very supportive or capable of facilitating effective 
extension service. The Mass Guidance Organization was liquidated. Without 
government supports, the village cooperatives are mostly closed down. The 
government seed enterprises are losing their vitalities. 
 It can be said that the agricultural technology delivery systems are in 
disarrayed. This may be the reason why some newly developed technologies in the 
research institutes have never reached the farmers or it takes so long time to reach 
the farmers. Although there have been many newly released HYV of food crops, 
only few of them significantly used by the farmers. In fact, most farmers remain 
using the very old HYV’s (Table 10). For rice, IR-64 which was released in 1986 
is still the most widely used by the farmers. For maize, the most widely used is 
Arjuna which was released in 1980. For soybean, the most widely used is Wilis 
which was released in 1983. 
 In addition to restraining innovation flows from R & D institutions to 
farmers, the disarrayed technology delivery systems may have caused declining 
supply of new knowledge and information at farm level which in turn causes sub 
optimal farm management. These technology, knowledge and information supply 
bottlenecks deserve immediate response from the government. 
 Perhaps the biggest mistake is that the policy for reducing government 
involvement in technology delivery system is not managed properly. For one 
thing, some elements of the technology delivery systems are private goods for 
which government involvement is necessary. Even if the government reduces its 
involvement, it should have been in the same time promoting private business 
involvement to substitute the government roles. The lacking of government 
involvement in the technology delivery system may explain the disarrayed 
technology delivery systems. 
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Table 10.  Adoption Rate (planted area shaw) and Potential Yield of 1980 – 2002 
 
Year 
Dominant 
Varieties 
Proportion 
(%) 
Potential yield 
(ton/ha) 
Year of 
Released 
Paddy     
1980 1.  PB 36 
2.  PB 38 
3.  PB32 
36.2 
  9.4 
  8.0 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
1978 
1978 
1977 
1985 1.  PB 36 
2.  Cisadane 
3.  PB 42 
28.9 
22.8 
  5.2 
4.5 
4.5 – 5.5 
5.5 
1978 
1980 
1980 
1990 1.  IR 64 
2.  Cisadane 
3.  PB 36 
15.7 
13.3 
10.3 
5 
4.5 – 5.5 
4.5 
1986 
1980 
1978 
1995 1.  IR 64 
2.  Cisadane  
3.  PB 42 
47.1 
  6.4 
  4.1 
5 
4.5 – 5.5 
5.5 
1986 
1980 
1980 
2000 1.  PB 42 
2.  Way Apo Boru 
3.  IR 66 
43.1 
  6.2 
  4.6 
5 
5.0 – 8.0 
4.5 – 5.0 
1986 
1998 
1989 
Maize     
1995 1.  Arjuna 
2.  Hibrida C-1 
3.  CPI-1 
31.1 
  9.1 
  8.4 
5.0 – 6.0 
6.2 – 7.0 
6.0 – 7.0 
1980 
1983 
1985 
2000 1.  Arjuna 
2.  Bisma 
3.  Hibrida C-1 
16.5 
  6.9 
  2.8 
5.0 – 6.0 
7.0 – 7.5 
6.2 – 7.0 
1980 
1995 
1983 
2002 1.  Arjuna 
2.  Bisma 
3.  Hibrida C-1 
11.2 
  4.1 
  1.8 
5.0 – 6.0 
7.0 – 7.5 
9.0 – 12.0 
1980 
1995 
1997 
Soybean     
1995 1.  Wilis 
2.  Orba 
3.  Lokon 
54.7 
  4.3 
  7.4 
1.1 – 2.1 
1.0 – 2.0 
1.2 – 2.2 
1983 
1974 
1982 
2000 1.  Wilis 
2.  Orba 
3.  Lokon 
20.4 
  4.2 
  1.7 
1.1 – 2.1 
1.0 – 2.0 
1.2 – 2.2 
1983 
1974 
1982 
2002 1.  Wilis 
2.  Orba 
3.  Lokon 
12.0 
  1.2 
  1.1 
1.1 – 2.1 
1.0 – 2.0 
1.2 – 2.2 
1983 
1974 
1982 
Source:  National Seeds Agency (various years) 
 
Over intensification syndrome 
 Another explanation for the decelerating land productivity (yield) is 
resource quality degradation due to excessive use of external input as well as over 
intensive land use. This is especially true for wetland paddy field (sawah). Modern 
rice HYVs requires high external inputs (particularly inorganic fertilizers and 
pesticides), perfect soil preparation, continuous irrigation which cause long-term 
negative impacts on soil quality. This problem is aggravated by the high land use 
intensity through year-round multiple cropping. 
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 Many studies have found that Indonesian wetland has been plaqued with 
the over intensification or soil fatigue syndrome. The soil is now lacking of 
organic matters and micronutrients. The physical properties of the soil has also 
been degradating. All of these have caused long-term declining of land 
productivity. 
 The over intensification syndrome is not particular for Indonesia. It has 
been proven well spread in many other countries which widely adopted high 
input-high output HYVs (Pingali, Hossain, and Gerpacio, 1997). Perhaps, this is 
the reason why total factor productivity of the rice farming in Indonesia declining  
as found by Simatupang et al. (1995) and Sudaryanto et al. (2002). Not only 
declining land productivity (yield), the over intensification syndrome causes 
increasing production cost and hence declining farming competitiveness. The over 
intensification syndrome can be considered as a long-term threat to Indonesian 
rice farming sustainability. 
 
Large and increasing number of small-scale family farms 
 Indonesian agriculture is dominated by large and increasing number of 
small scale family farms. Recent agricultural census indicated that in 2003 there 
were 25,437 million land-using farm households in Indonesia, 13,663 million or 
56.7 percent of which were marginal farmers with less than 0.5 ha of land under 
their control. In 1993 the number of land-using farm households was 20,518 
millions or was increasing at 1.8 percent per year, whereas the number of marginal 
farmers were 10,804 million or was increasing at 2.6 percent per year during the 
1993 – 2003 period. In Java, the numbers of land-using farm households and the 
marginal farmers were growing at 1.5 percent and 2.4 percent per year 
respectively. Whereas in outside Java, the numbers of land-using farm households 
and marginal farmers were growing at 2.1 percent and 3.4 percent per year 
respectively (Table 11). 
 
Table 11. Number and Growth Rate of Land-Using Household and Marginal Farmers in 
Indonesian, 1993-2002 
 
Category 
1993 2003 
Java 
Outside 
Java 
Indo-
nesia 
Java 
Outside 
Java 
Indo-
nesia 
1. Number (million)       
    a. Marginal farmers 8,067 
(69.8) 
2,737 
(30.6) 
10,894 
(52.7) 
9,989 
(74.9) 
3,674 
(33.9) 
13,663 
(56.5) 
    b. Land-using households 11,564 8,954 20,518 13,336 10,841 24,176 
    c. Agricultural households 11,671 9,116 20,787 13,964 11,472 25,437 
2. Growth rate 1993-2003 
    (%/year) 
      
    a. Marginal farmers    2.4 3.4 2.6 
    b. Land-using households    1.5 2.1 1.8 
    c. Agricultural households    2.0 2.6 2.2 
Figures in parentheses are percent of land-using households 
Source:  Central Bureau of Statistics. 
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 The statistics shows that population or employment pressure on 
agricultural land continued increasing. The growth rate of agricultural households 
much higher than the population that indicates the economy structural 
transformation turning point has not occurred in Indonesia. Consequently, the 
number of marginal farmers, and perhaps the landless laborers too, continued 
increasing with an accelerating rate. This trend is really worrisome. First, with 
very small size or inexistent of operated land, most of the marginal farmers and 
landless laborers must be poor. The Indonesian agriculture may be plagued with 
the so called poverty – food insecurity – land degradation triangle syndrome. 
 Second, a very small size of land operation is not conducive for 
progressive and efficient farm production. Land size smallness may prevent the 
farmers to quickly adopting new innovations which generally require high capital 
and have economies of scale to produce sufficiently large volume of outputs 
which necessary for efficient marketing as well as to acquire economic scale in 
input acquisition. Small farmers generally have higher cost of production (all 
inputs included) and lower output price, and hence lower profitability rate. 
 The increasing number of marginal farmers can be considered as 
increasingly stringent supply bottleneck. The root causes are the decelerating 
growth rate of agricultural land and the failure to reach the structural 
transformation tuning point of Indonesian macro-economy. The first may be 
considered as policy failure to promote investment in agricultural land 
development, whereas the second one is due to the failure of long-term over all 
economic development policies. 
 
Declining government investments 
 Perhaps the most critical bottleneck of the Indonesian agricultural supply 
is declining trend of government expenditure (in constant price) for agricultural 
development during the 1995/96 – 2000 period for all categories. Total 
development budget of the Ministry of Agriculture in 2000 was only about one 
third of its value in 1995/96. The expenditure for agricultural extension has been 
declining since mid 1980’s. The most dramatic one is the fertilizer subsidy which 
declining very rapidly since mid 1980’s and then erased to zero in 1999. It was, 
however, reviewed again in 2003. Expenditure for agricultural research and 
development (R & D) was ups and down. It declined during the second half of the 
1980’s, increased in the first half of the 1990’s, but then declined again in late 
1990’s. 
 The declining government expenditure for agricultural R & D and 
extension to some extent may explain the seemingly stagnation of agricultural 
innovations as reflected by the decelerating yield of most agricultural 
commodities. The declining government expenditure for irrigation development 
must also have significant negative effects on agricultural production. Many 
studies have shown, government expenditures on irrigation, R & D, and extension 
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are very instrumental for agricultural production (Mundlak, Larson and Butze, 
2002, Fuglie, 2003). 
 
Table 12. Government Expenditure for Agricultural Development, 1985/86 – 2000, 1993 
Prices (Rp.1000) 
 
Descriptions 
1985/ 
1986*) 
1990/ 
1991 
1995/ 
1996 
2000**) 2002 
Irrigation 801,790 969,848 982,237 227,330 378,435 
Research and development 29,322 21,732 53,474 29,893 27,560 
Extension / Training 36,060 35,270 25,956 14,194 12,424 
Fertilizer subsidy 1,738,550 330,847 120,946 0 0 
Min.Agriculture 
 (excl.Fish, incl.Est) 
284,550 314,235 479,130 144,804 424,405 
* Budgeted 
** 9 months realization 
Source:  Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
 Besides for infrastructures, government expenditures for input subsidies, 
fertilizer in particular, declined very rapidly since mid 1980’s. This was part of the 
massive economic deregulation policies conducted by Indonesian government 
since 1983 and expanded and intensified in 1986. Clearly the sharp declining 
government subsidies also contributed to the sharp decline of agricultural 
production growth since late 1980’s. But, it should be noted since 2001, the 
allocated budget for agriculture increased dramatically. Is this a sign of sustainable 
policy reversal? We hope so. The rural value of government expenditures for 
agricultural R&D and extension, however, continued declining. 
 
Farming incentives 
 Another agricultural promotion constraint is economic incentive, 
particularly input provision facilities and output price supports. Up to mid 1980’s 
the government provide many incentives for agricultural producers, rice farmers in 
particular. The incentives include input subsidies (fertilizers, seeds), price 
supports, subsidized credits, machineries provision for farmers groups, etc. As 
mentioned, since mid 1980’s the government has gradually reduced its supports 
for agricultural development. This includes reduction or stopping of its production 
incentives for farmers.  
The reduction or abolishment of input subsidies results in increasing 
production cost. As an example, fertilizer price has been increasing much faster 
than of many agricultural commodity prices. This can be seen from the declining 
paddy – fertilizer price ratio (Table 13). It should be noted the agricultural term of 
trade was slumped during the 1989-1994 period when the government 
significantly reduced its price supports. This was coincide with the sharp decline 
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of agricultural production growth. But since 2001, the terms of trade increased 
significantly. One of the reasons may be the change in the government policy 
direction. In this past three years the government has repeatedly pledge to protect 
and promote the agricultural sector. The government has imposed import tariffs to 
support paddy and sugar prices. The government also revived the fertilizer 
subsidy. Effectiveness and sustainability of those policies remain to be seen in 
some years to come. 
 
Table 13. Trend of farmer Terms of Trade in Java (1983 = 100) and Paddy-Fertilizer 
Price Ratio 1974-2002 
 
Year Terms of trade in Java 
Paddy fertilizer price ratio 
Urea TSP 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
--- 
--- 
84.87 
88.21 
87.40 
89.44 
88.66 
85.88 
90.41 
100.00 
101.51 
100.94 
105.27 
107.25 
110.00 
104.28 
105.00 
104.85 
99.75 
101.37 
102.99 
106.48 
107.17 
108.57 
107.56 
103.95 
102.57 
112.48 
118.97 
1.01 
0.90 
1.02 
1.10 
1.16 
1.46 
1.68 
1.87 
1.83 
1.82 
1.82 
1.81 
1.60 
1.50 
1.73 
1.49 
1.31 
1.39 
1.35 
1.24 
1.31 
1.47 
1.26 
1.18 
1.59 
1.19 
0.91 
-- 
-- 
1.48 
1.56 
1.60 
1.47 
1.32 
1.47 
1.64 
1.85 
1.82 
1.88 
1.82 
1.73 
1.46 
1.47 
1.79 
1.46 
1.19 
1.25 
1.18 
1.03 
1.10 
1.02 
0.96 
0.90 
1.21 
0.87 
0.64 
--- 
--- 
Source : Producers Price Economics indicators (various year), CBS 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Indonesian agriculture performance is now in danger of being trapped in 
persistently low and decelerating growth rate. Major food productions, such as 
rice, maize and soybean, have been growing at a rate below the population growth 
rate, even some of them has been either stagnant or contracting since mid 1990’s. 
This is the reason why food commodity importations have been increasing in 
recent years that could endangers national food security. 
Worst yet, the seemingly persistent decelerating agricultural production is 
not particular to major food commodities, but is also true for almost all 
agricultural commodities. The persistent decelerating growth is the general 
phenomenon for agricultural commodities. This is really an alarming problem that 
endangers the livelihood of the majority of Indonesian people, especially those in 
the poorest segment of the population. Indonesian agriculture is now in urgent 
need of emergency recovery supports from the government. 
The supply constraints are very stringent and extensive. The major ones 
are the continued declining of wetland paddy field (sawah) area, declining of dry 
land area in Java, and decelerating growths of all types of agricultural land in 
outside Java. This land problem is aggravated by the seemingly stagnant or 
decelerating yield of all agricultural commodities. The root causes include both of 
natural factors and policy market failures. Our attention must be focused on the 
policy matters. 
The policy related factors include declining of government investment on 
public infrastructure development, particularly irrigation, R&D, extension, 
stopping of investment facilities for new agricultural land development, and 
reduction of farming incentives. These within agricultural sector policy failures 
are aggravated by the overall economic development failure to achieve structural 
transformation failure which necessary to reduce population / employment 
pressure on agriculture. 
The agricultural supply bottlenecks can only be eased through completely 
reversing the previous government policy direction. First, government expenditure 
for development of agricultural infrastructures, particularly irrigation, R&D, and 
extension, must be increased significantly, to reverse the present declining trend. 
Second, the government should resume its leading involvement on new 
agricultural development and or provide facilities for private investments in this 
critically important area. Third, the R&D sector should be deregulated to facilitate 
private sector participation both in R&D and in technology transfer, including 
through international sources. Fourth, the government should resume its provision 
of farming incentives and facilities (input provision, price supplies, credit 
facilities) in the spirit of market failure correction. Fifth, promoting labor intensive 
rural industry development to provide employment alternative to rural labor for in 
order to ease employment pressure on agriculture.   
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Figure 1.  Framework for Identification of Sources of Production Growth and Their Determinants 
 
